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We present a theory of cultural evolution based upon a renormalization group scheme. We consider
rational but cognitively limited agents who optimize their decision making process by iteratively
updating and refining the mental representation of their natural and social environment. These
representations are built around the most important degrees of freedom of their world. Cultural
coherence among agents is defined as the overlap of mental representations and is characterized
using an adequate order parameter. As the importance of social interactions increases or agents
become more intelligent, we observe and quantify a series of dynamic phase transitions by which
cultural coherence advances in the society. A similar phase transition may explain the so-called
“cultural explosion” in human evolution some 50,000 years ago.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s, 05.45.-a, 05.10.Cc
I. INTRODUCTION
Culture is the sum of knowledge, beliefs, values and
behavioral patterns built up by a group of human be-
ings and transmitted from one generation to the next.
Cultural evolution for Homo sapiens started early in the
prehistoric age, and as archeological evidence suggests
it has gone through a number of short episodes during
which its prevalence and overall influence on everyday life
increased abruptly. The most important of these events
occurred approximately 50,000 years ago, giving birth to
art, music, religion and warfare. This episode is usually
termed the “cultural explosion” [1, 2].
The evolution of human culture is investigated in many
disciplines using different paradigms. Economics uses
game theory to understand the development of rules, so-
cial norms and other cultural institutions assuming ratio-
nal behavior of the constituting individuals (agents) [3].
Cognitive and behavioral sciences study how culture is
represented in the mind [4], and how these “mental repre-
sentations” change under social interactions [5]. Physics
views culture and its evolution as a complex, dynamic
system, and aims to identify its basic universal proper-
ties using simple minimal models [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
The emergence of culture seems to involve a chicken-
and-egg problem: culture becomes what the constituting
agents make it to be, and agents, based on their capacity
of learning, constantly adapt to the culture they happen
to live in. In this sense culture is the dynamic attractor of
the complex social dynamics, determined by the agents’
actual constraints and social interactions. The aim of
this paper is to investigate the properties of such cultural
attractors in an adequately formulated social dynamics
model, which integrates the relevant concepts from the
social sciences with those from the physics perspective.
One of the popular minimal models of cultural evolu-
tion is that of Axelrod [6, 7]. Axelrod’s model investi-
gates an initially random population of biologically and
economically uniform agents. Social interaction is limited
to an imitation process in which agents adapt cultural
traits stochastically from each other with a bias toward
already similar agents. The interesting question is un-
der what circumstances global cultural diversity gets pre-
served despite the homogenizing interaction [8, 9, 10, 11].
However, the question can also be posed from the oppo-
site direction: in a population with non-negligible het-
erogeneity and under social interactions which are not
necessarily imitational but rather reflect selfish individ-
ual interests how can a coherent culture emerge?
In order to study this question, our model differs from
that of Axelrod in two ways. First, we explicitly consider
individual decision making mechanisms and identify “di-
mension reduction” as a fundamental heuristic for cogni-
tively limited but otherwise rational agents. This is one
of the possible implementations of the concept of bounded
rationality well-known in economics and social sciences
[3, 12]. Specifically, agents are constrained to describe
and understand their world along a finite number of “con-
cepts” (Concepts). The totality of these Concepts consti-
tutes the agent’s cultural profile. The Concepts establish
an interface to the objective world: agents use them to
build an adequate mental representation of natural and
social reality for evaluating decision alternatives. Obvi-
ously, decision making is successful if evaluation is pre-
cise, thus rational agents face the problem of optimizing
their Concepts given the actual state of the world. Innate
or acquired heterogeneity in individual preferences, how-
ever, can give rise to substantial deviations in these opti-
mal Concepts across members of the population. People
with such differences in cultural profile end up having
unequal views of the world, they evaluate alternatives
differently, and make different choices accordingly [28].
Second, instead of a simple imitation process our
agents are assumed to interact in a competitive game
2[13]. We think of the Concepts as flexible mental con-
structs which are continuously updated and refined ac-
cording to a “best response dynamics” in order to max-
imize the agents’ predictive power in the actual natural
and social environment. As such, our model treats the
evolution of cultural profiles (the set of Concepts) as the
result of rational behavior governed by economic bene-
fit. The Concepts are continuous variables and agents
are assumed heterogeneous in their fixed preferences by
default.
Conceptually, our theory will be a renormalization
group theory as it is based on the following two key el-
ements: (i) it combines the original state variables (at-
tributes of decision alternatives) into important and less
important degrees of freedom; agents keep the former
(defined to be the Concepts), and discard the latter; (ii)
this is done in an iterative way taking into account the
other agents’ profiles and aiming to identify a fixed point
(associated with Culture). The criterion for truncating
the degrees of freedom is local: each agent tries to maxi-
mize its evaluation accuracy, i.e., to minimize the repre-
sentation/evaluation error within its cognitive limits.
II. A COGNITIVE MODEL
In order to define a simple, tractable model, we will
introduce two simplifying assumptions: we will assume
that the objective world in which the agents live is lin-
ear, and that the subjective heuristics that they use to
predict their environment is also linear, in a sense to be
made precise below. Clearly, these are important simpli-
fications as both the real world and the real mental mod-
els are likely to exhibit substantial non-linearities. For a
first analysis, however, this approximation is sufficient.
We consider I agents, each restricted to use a num-
ber K of Concepts only. Agents divide the world into
a number X of contexts in which they evaluate decision
alternatives according to their personal preferences. We
assume that alternatives are characterized by their ob-
jective (physical) attributes a = {a1, . . . , aD}. Agent i’s
theoretical payoff from choosing alternative a in context
x is posited to be a linear function (“linear world assump-
tion”)
pi
(x)
i (a) = ω
(x)
i · a, (1)
where ω
(x)
i is the agent’s preference vector, characteriz-
ing the agent’s personal (biological or otherwise acquired)
fixed preference in context x. For each agent there are
X preference vectors each of dimension D, which are as-
sumed fixed in the model.
An agent does not know his preference vectors explic-
itly as this would require a detailed understanding of
the effect of all attributes on his payoffs. However, by
collecting experience on choices he has made previously,
he learns to approximate the payoffs using an appropri-
ate mental representation. The mental representation is
context 1 context x context X
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FIG. 1: Decision making heuristic using Concepts as renor-
malized degrees of freedom.
built around the world’s K “most important degrees of
freedom”, constituting the agent’s Concepts. We assume
again that the approximate payoff that the agent “com-
putes” directly is linear (“linear representation assump-
tion”)
p˜i
(x)
i (a) = ω˜
(x)
i · a (2)
with
ω˜
(x)
i =
K∑
µ=1
v
(x)
iµ γiµ, (3)
the agent’s approximate preference vector (that the agent
knows explicitly). ω˜
(x)
i is decomposed using mental
weights v
(x)
iµ in a reduced subspace of dimension K. The
weight v
(x)
iµ reflects the significance of Concept µ in con-
text x. Equation (2) implies that agent i possesses a
number K of concept vectors, {γiµ}Kµ=1, assumed nor-
malized |γiµ| = 1, which the agent uses to evaluate al-
ternatives. We emphasize that the Concepts are defined
in a context-independent way, i.e, they have the same
“meaning” in all occurring contexts.
The structure of our model is depicted in Fig. 1.
We have defined three layers: the layer of “Physical At-
tributes” of the decision alternatives, the layer of Con-
cepts (defined by concept vectors) which constitute the
renormalized degrees of freedom, and the layer of context-
and agent-specific “Payoffs”. At the lowest level agents
are homogeneous and have identical information about
alternatives. In the highest layer agents are heteroge-
neous and have individual payoff functions based on their
individual preferences. The middle layer shows partial
coherence, whose measure, as we will see, is determined
by the strength of social interactions. This is the layer we
intend to monitor across society for observing the emer-
gence and evolution of a common Culture.
An example may be enlightening at this point. Think
about the world of chess where decision alternatives are
the possible moves a player can choose in a given situ-
ation. These moves are characterized by the position of
3the pieces on the board (physical attributes). Calculating
the payoff of a move (the probability of winning the game
with that move) is basically a two step procedure for hu-
man players and chess programs alike. First the move
is evaluated along some general Concepts like “material
advantage”, “positional advantage”, “pinned piece”, etc.
Indeed, research in psychology has demonstrated that a
human grand master possesses tens of thousands of such
chess-related concepts [14, 15]. Second, these concept
scores are weighted (mental weights) in an appropriate
mental model. The weighting scheme depends on the
player’s personal skills/style (agent heterogeneity) and
on the actual adversary (context dependence). There
is a theoretically best move (preference vector) for that
player with that adversary in that situation, but that
is not known explicitly to the player. Mastering chess
amounts to finding an optimal mental representation,
i.e., optimal Concepts and optimal weights (approximate
preference vectors) which allow a decision close to the
theoretical best. In chess there are different “schools”
(cultures) where the applied Concepts have somewhat
different meaning. Of course, decision in chess is very
non-linear, and our simplified linear model can only grasp
the big picture.
The hierarchical structure depicted in Fig. 1 formally
resembles a linear two-layer (concept vectors, mental
weights) neural network. Note, however, that it is not
a microscopic neural network model of a cognitive func-
tion, but a phenomenological (macroscopic) model of a
generic decision making strategy.
Under this cognitive architecture the number of vari-
ables defining an agent is (X + D)K, much less than
the total number of parameters describing the world,
XD. However, there is a price that should be paid for
bounded rationality: due to the reduction of dimension-
ality, K < D, the approximate payoff p˜i
(x)
i deviates from
the theoretical payoff pi
(x)
i . The agents’ goal is to find the
best possible set of Concepts and mental weights which
minimize the error of the mental representation under
the constraint that only K Concepts can be used. The
natural measure of agent i’s representation error is the
variance
Ei =
X∑
x=1
〈
(pi
(x)
i − p˜i(x)i )2
〉
x
, (4)
where 〈.〉x is the average over alternatives in context x.
We restrict our attention to the case, where the at-
tributes are delta correlated
〈a(x)d 〉x = 0, 〈a(x)d a(x)d′ 〉x = δdd′ (5)
and nontrivial structure is assumed in the agent-specific
preference vectors only. This simplifies the forthcoming
analysis without losing essential features. With this pro-
viso, the representation error turns out to be
Ei =
X∑
x=1
(
ω
(x)
i −
K∑
ν=1
v
(x)
iν γiν
)2
. (6)
The agents’ goal is to minimize the error Ei by optimally
choosing their concept vectors γiν and mental weights
v
(x)
iν . Recall that ω
(x)
i is assumed fixed in the model.
III. OPTIMAL CONCEPTS AS A PCA
PROBLEM
Theoretically the minimizing parameters can be easily
determined. Differentiating w.r.t. v
(x)
iµ and assuming that
the K × K metric tensor Γiνµ = γiν · γiµ is invertible
(note that the Concepts are not necessarily orthogonal),
the optimal mental weights read
v
(x)
iµ = ω
(x)
i · γµi , (7)
where we have introduced the “dual” concept vectors
γ
µ
i =
∑K
ν=1[Γ
−1
i ]µνγiν . Writing this back to Eq. (6)
we can write the error as
Ei =
X∑
x=1
|ω(x)i |2 −
X∑
x=1
K∑
µ=1
(ω
(x)
i ·γµi )(ω(x)i ·γiµ). (8)
In this way the representation error is written as a func-
tion of the γ concept vectors only. Conceptually this is
equivalent to the reasonable assumption that the men-
tal weights accommodate much faster than the Concepts
themselves.
Neglecting the first term, which is an unimportant con-
stant, we define the agent’s utility as the negative of his
overall representation error
Ui =
X∑
x=1
K∑
µ=1
(ω
(x)
i ·γµi )(ω(x)i ·γiµ), (9)
which should now be maximized for {γiν}Kν=1. The util-
ity can be written in a more compact form
Ui =
K∑
µ=1
γ
µ
i ·W i γiµ. (10)
by introducing a positive semi-definite, D × D dimen-
sional matrix, to be called the world matrix,
W i =
X∑
x=1
ω
(x)
i ◦ ω(x)i , (11)
which encompasses all information about agent i’s (ob-
jective) personal relationship to the world.
The maximization problem in Eq. (10) is the well-
known Principal Component Analysis (PCA) problem.
According to this, a particular solution for the optimal
Concept vectors is provided by the K most significant
(largest eigenvalue) eigenvectors ofW i. Thus to achieve
the best possible mental representation the agent should
choose his concept vectors according to the eigenvectors
of his world matrix in the order of their significance, and
4then adapt his mental weights according to Eq. (7). No-
tice, however, that this solution is not unique: any non-
singular basis transformation in the subspace of the K
most significant eigenvectors yields a different solution
with identical utility. We can freely define linear transfor-
mations in the subspace of Concepts; the mental weights
adapt, and the overall representation error remains un-
changed. It is obvious that ifW i is a non-singular, rank-
D matrix, then for K < D the error is strictly positive
even with an optimally chosen set of Concepts.
Relationship with the DMRG
The identification, sorting and truncation of the de-
grees of freedom in our model is closely analogous to what
occurs inWhite’s Density Matrix Renormalization Group
method (DMRG) [16] – a numerical technique widely
used in the simulation of strongly correlated quantum
systems. In the DMRG the optimally renormalized de-
grees of freedom turn out to be the K most significant
eigenvectors of the reduced density matrix of the quan-
tum subsystem embedded in the environment with which
it interacts.
A formal mapping between the DMRG and our method
can be established by identifying the DMRG’s density
matrix for block i with the world matrix W i for agent i
(both measuring the subsystem’s relationship to the envi-
ronment), and the renormalized (kept) quantum mechan-
ical degrees of freedom with the Concepts. The DMRG’s
“truncation error” is analogous to our representation er-
ror. There, the error measures how precisely the en-
tangled quantum mechanical wave function (written in
a matrix form) is reconstructed after the truncation of
the degrees of freedom; here, the role of the wave func-
tion is played by the D ×X dimensional matrix formed
by the preference vectors ω
(x)
i . The two problems are
conceptually similar in that both seek an optimal linear
reduction of dimensionality for the subsystem, which is
mathematically equivalent to the PCA problem.
IV. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
As shown above, the representation error is minimal
if the agent learns to approximate his world matrix in
the K dimensional subspace spanned by the most signif-
icant eigenvectors of his world matrix. If agents i and j
have different preferences, and thus different world matri-
ces, they would necessarily end up with different optimal
Concepts. Cultural evolution boils down to the interac-
tion of these different Concepts in a social network. In
order to introduce social interactions we cast contexts
into two basic categories: those where preference vectors
only depend on a single agent (“individual contexts”),
and those where the preference vectors for agent i depend
on the (simultaneous) decision/preference of at least an-
other agent j (“social contexts”). For simplicity only
pair interactions will be considered. In social contexts
the understanding of another agent’s valuation and deci-
sion making mechanism is an asset. Agent i has strategic
advantage from being able to estimate j’s payoff for her
alternatives. Again, chess is an illustrative example. Al-
ways playing against the same unchanging computer soft-
ware is an individual context, whereas playing against a
human adversary capable of learning from her errors is a
social context.
In a given context, agent j bases her evaluations on
her mental representation which is characterized by her
approximate preference vector ω˜
(x)
j . This is necessarily
within her actual Concept subspace. Agent i tries to ap-
proximate this within his Concept subspace. The accu-
racy of this approximation depends on the overlap of the
two subspaces. Thus social contexts introduce a “force”
which tries to deform i’s Concept subspace towards that
of j in order to improve i’s predictive power in j-related
social contexts. The interplay between the two compet-
ing goals – optimizing the mental representation for so-
cial contexts vs. individual ones – is the ultimate factor
which determines the society’s cultural coherence.
In terms of the above classification, agent i’s overall
world matrix is a sum of individual and social contribu-
tions. As seen above, individual contexts contribute
W 0i =
X∑
x=1
ω
(x)
i ◦ ω(x)i ; x = individual, (12)
and the contribution of all j-related social contexts is now
W
j
i =
∑
x
ω˜
(x)
j ◦ ω˜(x)j x = j-related social. (13)
The interpretation of W ji is that agent j’s approximate
preference vectors (which determine her decisions) are
fully presented to agent i (they build into his world ma-
trix), but – in accordance with the central thesis of our
model – agent i can only pick up from this what his in-
ternal Concepts span.
We realize that W ji is a rank-K operator, which can
be expressed explicitly in terms of j’s concept vectors
{γjµ}Kµ=1 and mental weights v(x)jµ using Eq. (3). This
explicit representation has the structure
W
j
i = BSj , (14)
i.e., the product of
Sj =
K∑
µ=1
γjµ ◦ γµj , (15)
projecting onto agent j’s Concept subspace, and another
operator B acting within this subspace. This latter de-
pends on the actual v
(x)
jµ weights, but for simplicity in
what follows we assume that it is proportional to the
identity operator
B = hij 1. (16)
5This assumption simply states that all directions in j’s
Concept subspace have equal importance for i, and is rea-
sonable if i has to predict j’s behavior in many different
j-related contexts which average out the weight depen-
dence.
Eventually, agent i’s overall world matrix to be used
in the utility Eq. (10) takes the form
W i =W
0
i +
∑
j∈Ni
hij Sj , (17)
the sum being over the agent’s social network Ni. The
parameters hij measure the relative strength (impor-
tance) of social interactions with agent j. The equal
importance assumption assures that ourW i remains in-
variant w.r.t. nonsingular local linear transformations of
the individual concept vectors. This means that in our
model the actual choice of Concepts do not count, only
the subspace they span do.
Using Eq. (17) in Eq. (10) allows us to write the agent’s
utility function in an explicit form, which only depends
on the concept vectors,
Ui =
K∑
µ=1
γ
µ
i ·W 0i γiµ +
∑
j∈Ni
hij
K∑
µ,ν=1
(γνi · γjµ)(γiν · γµj ).
(18)
Adjustment dynamics
The introduction of social interactions in our model
of mental representations results in an economic game
where the agents’ optimization problems are potentially
in conflict. We can view the society as a dynamical sys-
tem in which agents continuously act as best-response
optimizers [18], in each step maximizing their utility
given the actual state of nature and other agents (best-
response dynamics). Alternatively, and this is more con-
sistent with bounded rationality, we can postulate a slow,
continuous adjustment dynamics which drives agents to-
wards ever better responses. In this spirit the time evo-
lution of the concept vectors is defined to be
δγiµ
δt
= const
∂Ui
∂γiµ
, (19)
where Ui is given by Eq. (18) (gradient adjustment dy-
namics). Since in the general case Ui depends on all
agents’ all Concepts, this in fact amounts to I ×K cou-
pled equations. As we will see below the two dynamics
lead to the same result.
The cultural coherence order parameter
In order to monitor cultural coherence we introduce
a coherence order parameter (COP) as the population
average of Concept subspace projector operators
O = 〈Sj〉I =
〈
K∑
µ=1
γjµ ◦ γµj
〉
I
. (20)
Our COP is a tensor order parameter which measures the
average overlap of the individual Concept subspaces. In
fact it is a high-dimensional generalization of de Gennes’s
tensor order parameter introduced in the theory of liquid
crystals [17]. The eigenvalue structure of O is useful to
characterize the level of coherence in the society and to
distinguish different phases. Obviously, if there is perfect
order and the individual Concept subspaces are all lined
up, the COP has eigenvalues o1 = o2 = . . . = oK = 1,
and oK+1 = oK+2 = . . . = oD = 0. In the opposite
extreme of complete disorder all directions are equivalent
and the eigenvalues are o1 = o2 = . . . = oD = K/D. The
trace of the COP is always K.
V. CULTURAL ORDERING AS A PHASE
TRANSITION
The equilibrium and dynamic properties of the social
system depend crucially on the parameters D,X,K, the
statistical properties of W 0i , and the social interaction
matrix hij (connectivity structure). In the following we
analyze the case when the agents’ individual preference
vectorsω
(x)
i areGaussian random vectors with zero mean
and unit variance, i.e., without interaction agents choose
random Concept subspaces (complete disorder). This is
a benchmark case which can demonstrate in its purest
form how culture can emerge spontaneously in an inter-
acting social system. With this assumption W 0i , which
is quadratic in the preference vectors, has Wishart distri-
bution [19, 20]. We restrict our attention to a mean-field
network (all agents are connected) and set hij = h/I.
With this the world matrix simplifies to
W i =W
0
i + hO. (21)
As discussed above there are various possibilities for
reasonable evolutionary dynamics. We have analyzed
the social behavior under two: the best response dy-
namics and the continuous gradient adjustment dynam-
ics defined in Eq. (19). In the best response dynamics we
started from a certain initial condition of individual Con-
cepts. In each step, we first calculated the actual COP,
then updated (with a certain probability to make the up-
date asynchronous) each agent’s Concepts according to
the K largest principal components of W i. This gave
agent i’s best response for the actual environment (indi-
vidual plus social). In the gradient adjustment method
we discretized the differential equation in Eq. (19).
Fixed points of the best response dynamics are Nash
equilibria, where agents have no incentive to unilaterally
deform their mental representations, because these are
already mutually optimal. Fixed points attained dynam-
ically by gradient adjustment, in turn, are necessarily
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FIG. 2: Fixed point spectrum of the order parameter matrix
O for D = X = 10, K = 4, I = 2000. Solid lines apply for
increasing h, dashed line (only shown for o1) for decreasing
h. The phase transitions occur as subcritical bifurcations.
stable against small collective perturbations in the con-
cept vectors, i.e., when several agents consider slight de-
viations simultaneously, but not necessarily optimal on a
global scale. It is a special feature of our model (which
is usually not the case in other models) that these two
dynamics have identical fixed points, i.e., the attained
fixed point of the gradient dynamics is also a Nash equi-
librium, and vice versa. This feature stems from the fact
that the landscape of the PCA’s quadratic error func-
tion is known to be smooth with a unique minimizing
subspace [21]. This is enough to assure the equivalence
of fixed points. However, in the case of multiple agents
(coupled PCA problems) the number of fixed points may
not be unique. In fact our results demonstrate that it is
typical to have many equilibria, the structure of which
depends strongly on h.
In case of multiple equilibria, equilibrium selection be-
comes important. In the following we analyze a situa-
tion when the strength of social interactions h is varied
slowly. An adiabatic change in the exogenous parame-
ters assures that the fixed point the system has reached
is tracked analytically, except for possible bifurcations.
We start with zero coupling, h = 0, where the (unique)
fixed point arises as the collection of individual PCA so-
lutions.
The COP spectrum in the fixed point, determined by
a numerical simulation with adiabatic increase (and de-
crease) of h for D = 10, X = 10, K = 4 and I = 2000 is
depicted in Fig. 2. The finite population of agents with
random world matrices were artificially “symmetrized”
to assure 〈W 0i 〉 = K/D 1 exactly even in a finite sample
at h = 0. This symmetrization procedure, however, is
irrelevant if the sample is large enough.
According to the figure, for small h there is complete
disorder, and all eigenvalues are equal, ok = K/D, ∀k.
In other words there is no systematic overlap between
the agents’ Concepts. For h → ∞ the fixed point is
completely ordered: ok = 1 if k ≤ K, zero otherwise,
meaning that agents share all K Concepts, i.e., we can
talk about a coherent culture. In between we observe a
series of dynamic phase transitions, each associated with
the sudden emergence of an additional shared Concept.
Each transition can be associated with a first order jump
in the eigenvalues through a subcritical bifurcation. In
accordance with the subcritical nature of the bifurcation
scheme hysteresis is observed. Figure 2 only shows how
o1 behaves as h diminishes from its maximum value, but
the behavior is similar for the other eigenvalues too. A
qualitatively identical picture, with a series of first or-
der transitions and hysteresis, was found numerically for
other parameter values, as well.
Our results suggest that the social dynamics has a
unique equilibrium only for small couplings. Above the
critical value hc spontaneous ordering occurs in the sys-
tem, and the number of equilibria increases. On the one
hand, there is a discrete number of possible fixed point
“families” as represented by the eigenvalue structure of
the COP: an adiabatically slow change in h leads to bifur-
cations at some critical values, where the system jumps
from one equilibrium to another. These transitions are
irreversible and give rise to hysteresis, which assures the
coexistence of at least two different equilibrium families
within the hysteresis loop. On the other hand, each fam-
ily of equilibria is infinitely degenerate in itself, since
the associated eigenvectors of the COP can point in es-
sentially any direction (respecting orthogonality). Since
we assumed that preferences are random, there are no
preferred directions on the social level by default. This
symmetry of the D-space is broken spontaneously above
hc. As h → ∞ there is only one possible structure for
the eigenvalues of the COP (there is only one family),
meaning that the society is fully coherent. However, this
coherent K-dimensional subspace, representing the most
important dimensions of the society is not fixed a priori.
The ultimate state of culture gets selected as a result of
the idiosyncratic fluctuations present at the time of the
symmetry breaking bifurcations.
Calculating the critical point
The critical interaction strength hc, where the com-
pletely disordered phase loses stability for increasing h
can be calculated analytically for I →∞. Starting from
the disordered phase we can write the COP in step l as
O = (K/D)1+ ε δOl, (22)
where δOl is an arbitrary perturbation. The dynamics
defines a mapping
δOl → δOl+1. (23)
If the disordered state is stable we have ||δOl|| → 0 as
l→∞, otherwise ||δOl|| diverges. We can identify hc as
a fixed point of this mapping
δOl+1 = δOl, (24)
7and determine δOl+1 as a function of δOl and h using
first order perturbation theory in ε. The calculation nec-
essarily involves the spectral properties of the random
W 0i ensemble, and leads to (see the Appendix for de-
tails)
hc =
D2
2
∑K
ν=1 ξν
, (25)
with
ξν =
〈
D∑
m 6=ν
1
λiν − λim
〉
I
, (26)
where λim are eigenvalues (in descending order) of the
Wishart matrix W 0i , and ν is the index for Concepts.
When ν << D,X we find that ξν is ν-independent,
and takes the form (see the Appendix)
ξν =
1
2
(
1− (X −D − 1)
D +X + 2
√
DX
)
. (27)
In the limit D,X →∞ with X/D = r > 0 and K << D
this leads to the critical coupling
hc ≈ D
2
K
1 +
√
r
2
. (28)
Keeping r fixed, hc increases in D (quadratically) and
decreases in K. When the World is complex (large D
andX) and the agents are primitive (smallK) the critical
coupling is high and the society is likely to stay culturally
disordered. A schematic phase diagram on the h vs K
plain is presented in Fig. 3. The hc curve cuts the plain
into two basic domains: one which is disordered and one
which is spontaneously ordered. This latter is divided
further into sub-domains with different levels of order,
separated by first order transition lines.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, in this paper we have proposed a theory
of cultural evolution built upon a renormalization group
scheme. We assumed that bounded rationality forces
agents to choose a limited set of concepts in describing
their world. These concepts and the way they are used
are continuously updated and refined in order to find an
optimal representation. Individual interest in making the
best possible decisions in natural (individual) and social
(collective) contexts act as a driving force for cultural
evolution and, at least in the particular cases studied,
drive the system towards a Nash equilibrium fixed point
with measurable level of social (cultural) coherence. In
our model with random preferences this coherence man-
ifested itself as a spontaneous ordering of the individual
concept (sub)spaces, and was quantified by an adequate
order parameter. We demonstrated that as the funda-
mental cognitive and social parameters change, cultural
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FIG. 3: Schematic phase diagram on the h vs. K plain
(D,X = fixed) for the mean-field model with random prefer-
ences. Solid line indicates the principal transition calculated
in the text, dashed lines the additional transitions.
evolution goes through a number of phase transitions,
which we found first order in the mean-field model. The
critical value of the most relevant transition was calcu-
lated analytically using linear stability arguments and
random matrix theory.
Transition to a phase with substantially higher cul-
tural coherence can be triggered in two different ways
(see the arrows in Fig. 3): social contexts can increase in
significance, or alternatively, agents may develop better
cognitive skills. In any case when one of the transition
lines is crossed, the subspaces spanned by the agents’ con-
cepts rearrange into a state with higher average overlap,
and we can speak about a boost in cultural coherence.
A similar transition may explain the sudden cultural ex-
plosions for humanity approximately 50,000 years ago,
and a further jump about 10,000 years ago in connection
with the emergence of agriculture. Since in our model
the ordering involves a spontaneous symmetry breaking,
the emerging fixed point strongly depends on the initial
perturbation (a phenomenon usually termed “path de-
pendence” in the social sciences), implying that cultural
evolution is not completely deterministic but depends on
a number of idiosyncratic factors.
Our theory differs conceptually from some traditional
thinking on the possible causes underlying human cul-
tural explosion. Most of these traditional explanations
presume a sudden and substantial biological change (ge-
netic mutations [2, 25], the integration of cognitive mod-
ules in the brain [1], etc.) as the initial trigger. In con-
trast with these, the mechanism we have proposed in
this paper suggests a spontaneous ordering of the men-
tal representations, which emerges when slow changes in
some relevant variables (cognitive abilities, social interac-
tions) reach a critical level. In this respect the “culture-
less state” of the society, originally rooted in the hetero-
geneity of its members in individual preferences, needs,
8experiences and the extreme simplicity of the mental rep-
resentations they possess, becomes unstable at a bifurca-
tion point, beyond which the collective social dynamics
drives the system into a drastically different, culturally
ordered fixed point.
It would be interesting to go beyond mean field, and
investigate the model’s dynamics in more realistic so-
cial networks, where the fixed point may possess a more
complex internal structure. A non-mean-field-like so-
cial structure is expected to give rise to subcultures or
cultural domains, where individuals are highly coher-
ent within a domain, but the average cultural subspace
the domain represents may be rather different from that
of another domain, as occurs usually in real societies.
The type of the occurring dynamic transitions may also
change character. An evaluation of how a potential
structure in the attribute space or non-linearity in the
world/mental representations influence the results could
also be interesting. Other intriguing problems involve
the social dynamics itself, namely how the model should
be extended to cope with intrinsically dynamical aspects
of culture such as fads and fashions, where the social at-
tractor is much rather a limit cycle or a chaotic attractor.
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APPENDIX
In the disordered phase the order parameter is diagonal
O =
K
D
1. (A.1)
In order to assess the stability of this phase assume that
in step l of the iterated dynamics the actual order pa-
rameter differs from this by a small perturbation
Oini =
K
D
1+ εOl, (A.2)
where ε is infinitesimal. In the next step, using Oini, we
should first create the agent specific context matrices
W i =W
0
i + hO
ini, (A.3)
and diagonalize these to obtain the actual (orthogonal)
concept vectors
W iγin = ηinγin, n = 1, . . . , D. (A.4)
When the eigenvalues ηin are sorted in descending or-
der, the agent keeps Concepts n = 1, . . . ,K. To finish
this iteration step we calculate the updated (final) order
parameter as
Ofin =
〈
K∑
ν=1
γiν ◦ γiν
〉
=
K
D
1+ εOl+1. (A.5)
which defines Ol+1. The disordered state is stable and
the perturbation dies away if ||Ol|| → 0 as l → ∞; oth-
erwise it is unstable.
In fact each step of the dynamics defines a mapping
from Ol to Ol+1. This mapping can be approximated as
linear if ε is small. Ol can be decomposed into D × D
“eigenmatrices” each of which transforms into a constant
(the eigenvalue) times itself under the mapping. The dis-
ordered state loses stability when the maximal eigenvalue
becomes greater than one. Thus hc can be found by seek-
ing the solution of the equation
Ol+1 = Ol. (A.6)
Let us introduce the orthonormal eigenvectors of the
Wishart matrix W 0i
W 0iφin = λin φin, n = 1, . . . , D, (A.7)
with λi1 ≥ . . . ≥ λiD. When ε is small we can use first
order perturbation theory to obtain the concept vectors
(eigenvectors) in Eq. (A.4). This yields
γiν = φiν + εh
D∑
m 6=ν
[Ol]νm
λiν − λimφim +O(ε
2) (A.8)
Substituting this into Eq. (A.5) we obtain
Ofin =
〈
K∑
ν=1
φiν ◦ φiν
〉
I
+ ε h
〈
K∑
ν=1
D∑
m=1
[Ol]νm
λiν − λim (φiν ◦ φim + φim ◦ φiν)
〉
I
+O(ε2).
(A.9)
To evaluate the terms we can use the fact that the eigen-
values and eigenvectors of the random matrix ensemble
W 0i can be considered independent, and thus the average
of a product containing both decouples. Remarking that
〈φiνdφi′ν′d′〉I = 1
D
δii′δνν′δdd′ , (A.10)
we obtain that the first term is simply (K/D)1, and the
second term defines Ol+1 as
[Ol+1]dd′ = h
D∑
m,m′=1
Add′;mm′ [Ol]mm′ (A.11)
where the mapping operator A is
Add′;mm′ =
1
D2
K∑
ν=1
ξν (δdmδd′m′ + δdm′δd′m) (A.12)
9with
ξν =
〈
D∑
m 6=ν
1
λiν − λim
〉
I
(A.13)
Using the fact that both Ol and Ol+1 is symmetric this
reduces to
[Ol+1]dd′ =
2h
D2
K∑
ν=1
ξν [Ol]dd′ , (A.14)
showing that the (normalized) eigenmatrices of the map-
ping are the D(D + 1)/2 independent (unit) matrix ele-
ments, and the common eigenvalue is D(D + 1)/2 times
degenerate. In virtue of Eq. (A.6) this eigenvalue defines
the critical social coupling
hc =
D2
2
∑K
ν=1 ξν
. (A.15)
The only remaining question is how to evaluate the
denominator. The theory of random matrices[22] gives
a solution. Recall that W ≡ W 0i belongs to the real
Wishart ensemble as it is the outer product of a D ×X
real Gaussian matrix with its transpose
W = ΩΩT, (A.16)
where Ω is the D×X matrix constructed from the pref-
erence vectors ω(x) as columns. The joint probability
density of eigenvalues for real Wishart matrices is [20, 23]
P ({λ}) d{λ} = 1Z exp

−1
2
min(D,X)∑
d=1
λd

 ·
min(D,X)∏
d=1
λ
(|X−D|−1)/2
d
min(D,X)∏
n>m
(λn − λm) d{λ}
(A.17)
for the min(D,X) nonzero eigenvalues, and there areD−
X zero eigenvalues if D > X . The partition function Z
is a normalization constant. It is illuminating to write
this in the Coulomb gas representation [23]
P ({λ}) = 1Z exp

−min(D,X)∑
d=1
V (λd) +
min(D,X)∏
n>m
ln |λn − λm|


(A.18)
with
V (λ) =
1
2
λ− |X −D| − 1
2
lnλ. (A.19)
In this expression the eigenvalues can be interpreted as
coordinates of particles put in an external potential V
and interacting through a 2D Coulomb interaction. For
large D and X , the average position of particles (eigen-
values) follows from a saddle-point approximation leading
to the equation
∂λnV =
min(D,X)∑
m=1
′ 1
λn − λm . (A.20)
Using the explicit form of V in Eq. (A.19) this reads
1− |X −D| − 1
λn
= 2
min(D,X)∑
m=1
′ 1
λn − λm . (A.21)
When the number of zero eigenvalues is taken into ac-
count correctly, we obtain for ξν defined in Eq. (A.13)
2ξν = 1− (X −D − 1)
〈
1
λν
〉
, (A.22)
and thus using Eq. (A.15)
hc =
D2
K − (X −D − 1)
〈∑K
ν=1 1/λν
〉 . (A.23)
It is interesting that the correction in the denominator
changes sign when X = D + 1.
In the general case a closed form approximation can
be obtained for small K. The limit spectral density of
the nonzero eigenvalues of Wishart matrices is given by
the Marcenko-Pastur law [24]
ρ(λ) =
1
2pimin(D,X)
√
(λ − λmin) (λmax − λ)
λ2
;
λmin =
(√
D −
√
X
)2
,
λmax =
(√
D +
√
X
)2
, (A.24)
which has a finite support λ ∈ (λmin, λmax) and a square-
root singularity as λ → λmax. If D,X is large and
K << min(D,X), the K largest eigenvalues are all close
to λmax. Thus in this limit〈
K∑
ν=1
1
λν
〉
≈ K
λmax
, (A.25)
which using Eq. (A.23) in the limit K << D,X → ∞
gives Eq. (28) in the text.
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